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Abstract 
The welfare effort (social spending as a percentage of GDP) has conventionally 
been the preferred measure for comparisons in space and time of the level of 
development of welfare states. However, frequent mentions are made in the 
relevant literature of the drawbacks of this measure as an empirical reference (e.g. 
it can be demonstrated that in certain conditions it provides a distorted picture of 
the relative levels of development of social protection systems). This study sets out 
to determine the extent of the shortcomings of the welfare effort measure for 
quantifying the relative standards of social protection. 
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The drawbacks of welfare effort in measuring Social Spending Trends 
1 Introduction 
For over 30 years it has been claimed that the welfare state is in crisis.  We now 
have more information on events in the last quarter of the 20th century, which may 
be sufficient for us to draw up a practically definitive assessment of this topic.  
However, it is difficult to find evidence in the relevant literature of any basic 
consensus on recent trends in welfare states. In a similar context of lack of 
consensus concerning the determinant factors in the development of the welfare 
state between the end of the Second World War and the recession of the 1970s, 
O’Connor & Brym (1988) claimed to have found the cause of that lack of consensus 
in the fact that the various theories sought empirical support for their assertions 
based on different measures and indicators which therefore provided different 
pictures and led to different conclusions concerning the relative development of 
welfare states. 
In research into the consequences of the crisis of welfare states there is also a 
curious link between the type of measures used and the conclusions drawn from 
analyses. For example, most studies that postulate the resilience of the welfare 
state use a measure of the weight of social spending in the economy (welfare effort 
measured in terms of social spending as a percentage of GDP), while those that 
highlight the magnitude of cutbacks base their conclusions on the degree to which 
social needs are covered by social welfare provisions. 
Welfare effort is by far the most widely used measure in empirical literature for 
gauging trends in welfare states. Since the papers by Wilensky (1975), most 
classical research on the determining factors in the expansion of social protection 
has used this measure as a dependent variable (Pampel & Williamson, 1988; 
Schmidt, 1997; Huber Ragin & Stephens, 1993; Hicks & Swank, 1992; O’Connor, 
1988; Schmidt, 1983; Stephens, 1979; Cameron, 1978); and many more recent 
contributions to the field have followed suit (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Iversen, 
2001). Similarly, welfare effort has played a leading role in debates on the 
retrenchment of the welfare state and the consequences of globalisation for public-
sector policies in developed countries (Castles, 2001; Pierson, 1996; Alber, 1988). 
In this context, the present study has been developed to point out the evident 
shortcomings of using welfare effort alone to describe social spending trends, and 
as a result to compare the hypotheses concerning trends in the welfare state. 
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2 Changes in magnitude of social protection described via welfare effort. 
1980-2001 
Table 1. Public social spending as a percentage of GDP 
Country 1980 1990 2001 1990-2001 1980-2001 
Australia 11.3 14.2 18.0 3.8 6.7 
Canada 14.3 18.6 17.8 -0.8 3.5 
USA 13.3 13.4 14.8 1.3 1.5 
Ireland 17.0 18.6 13.8 -4.9 -3.2 
New Zealand 17.2 21.9 18.5 -3.4 1.3 
UK 17.9 19.5 21.8 2.3 3.9 
Liberal* 14.0 14.7 15.9 1.1 1.9 
Denmark 29.1 29.3 29.2 -0.1 0.2 
Finland 18.5 24.8 24.8 0.0 6.3 
Norway 17.9 24.7 23.9 -0.8 6.0 
Sweden 28.8 30.8 29.8 -1.0 1.0 
Social-democratic* 25.0 28.0 27.3 -0.8 2.3 
Germany 23.0 22.8 27.4 4.6 4.4 
Austria 22.5 24.1 26.0 1.9 3.5 
Belgium 24.1 26.9 27.2 0.3 3.1 
France 21.1 26.6 28.5 1.8 7.3 
The Netherlands 26.9 27.6 21.8 -5.9 -5.2 
Conservative* 22.7 24.9 27.1 2.2 4.4 
Spain 15.9 19.5 19.6 0.0 3.7 
Greece 11.5 20.9 24.3 3.4 12.9 
Italy 18.4 23.3 24.4 1.2 6.0 
Portugal 10.9 13.9 21.1 7.2 10.2 
Southern Europe* 16.9 21.7 22.8 1.0 5.8 
Japan 10.2 11.2 16.9 5.7 6.7 
Switzerland 14.2 17.9 26.4 8.5 12.2 
All* 16.3 17.4 18.9 1.5 2.7 
Coefficient of variation ** 30.8 24.7 20.6 - - 
Sources: SOCX database (1980-2001), OECD. 
*The figures given for each family or regime and for the "All" category indicate the level of 
spending as a whole in the aggregate category in question, measured in US dollars as a 
percentage of aggregate GDP in the same accounting unit.  
** The coefficient of variation is expressed in percentage terms. 
This heading is intended to assess the validity of changes in the welfare effort as a 
measure of the scope of the welfare state reforms during the crisis period. 
Table 1 gives a general view of the performance of welfare effort between 1980 and 
2001.  An analysis of these data results in the following conclusions, among others: 
− No generalised reduction in welfare effort is observed.  Indeed if the countries 
are considered as a whole, effort increases by 2.7% over the full period, which 
can be seen as evidence of the health of the welfare state in the developed 
world. 
− Some correction in welfare effort is observed in some countries, e.g. Ireland 
and the Netherlands. 
− The frequency of spending cuts is higher in the nineties. Strikingly, three of the 
four countries representing the Social-democratic world make corrections in this 
decade, which would support the thesis that adjustments are taking place in the 
countries with the most highly-developed welfare states.  
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− Elsewhere, by contrast - especially in the Southern Europe area -, there have 
been major increases in social protection effort.  Three of these countries joined 
what is now the European Union in the 1980s after emerging from long periods 
of dictatorship.  At the time of their incorporation into the process of European 
integration all three had relatively backward economies and were still 
consolidating the democratic credentials of their political systems. The increase 
in social spending in these countries over the 20 years of the study period can 
be interpreted in the context of a process of adaptation and homologation to 
bring them into line with their more highly developed neighbours in Europe.  
− The combination of downward adjustments in the countries with the highest 
spending levels in the initial period and strong upward adjustments in other 
countries results in a narrower dispersal of welfare effort across countries. 
− In short, an analysis of changes between 1980 and 2001 provides a relatively 
optimistic picture of the future of welfare states.  Reductions in welfare effort 
are observed in only two of the 21 countries considered, and the average level 
continues to rise.  However, there are elements that indicate otherwise: at first 
glance the data give the impression that a more widespread adjustment took 
place at the end of the period under study.  Between 1990 and 2001 reductions 
are observed in seven countries, including three from the social-democratic 
world: Denmark, Norway and Sweden.  
The above conclusions will be familiar to readers accustomed to the literature on 
the recent history of the welfare state.  Indeed, some of them have become clichés 
of that literature. Our next question takes a very different tack: to what extent do 
these conclusions depend on the way in which measurements were taken? 
3 The drawbacks of welfare effort as a measure  
Welfare effort is by far the most widely used measure in empirical literature on the 
relative levels of development of social policies.  Its attractiveness probably lies in 
the readily apparent advantages of aggregation, availability and comparability with 
other measures that refer to GDP.  However, it has major shortcomings which limit 
its usefulness and make maximum caution advisable in interpreting it.  
First of all, it may be unsuitable as a measure of the level of development of social 
policy, i.e. changes in the measure may be caused by factors other than increases 
in social rights, e.g. the demographics of the population, so an increase in social 
spending measured in relation to GDP does not necessarily indicate an 
improvement in social citizenship status (Korpi, 1989: 314). Clayton & Pontusson 
make a similar complaint concerning welfare effort, stating that "such measures fail 
to take account of changes in societal welfare needs" (1998: 70). 
Secondly, welfare effort shows changes in social spending and GDP simultaneously, 
so it is influenced by the performance of the denominator.  
These shortcomings have been described frequently in the relevant literature, so it 
seems logical to wonder how far the relative trends in welfare effort are the result 
of factors other than the way in which systems deal with and provide for the social 
needs of citizens. Surprisingly, as far as we are aware, the relevant literature 
contains no systematic attempts to determine this.  An initial proposal along these 
lines is made below, based on a fairly straightforward relationship between welfare 
effort and its immediate determinants: 
SS
GDP = 
SS
Dep Pop × 
Dep Pop
Pop  × 
Pop 
GDP  
where: 
• “SS” is social spending. 
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• “DepPop” is the dependent population calculated as the sum of those aged 65 or 
more and the unemployed population. 
• “Pop” is the total population. 
• and “GDP” is gross domestic product. 
The identifying elements can be renamed as follows:  
Welfare effort = SSGDP ; Welfare Standard = 
SS
Dep Pop ; Incidence =
Dep Pop
Pop  ; 
1 
Income = 
Pop 
GDP  
and can therefore be rewritten as: 
Effort ≡ Welfare Standard × Incidence × 
1 
Income   (1) 
This expression highlights the fact that the social spending effort in a given country 
depends not only on the extent to which protection systems cover situations in 
need but also on other factors.  More specifically, welfare effort is: 
• directly proportional to the standards of spending (measured in spending per 
dependent); 
• directly proportional to the incidence of situations covered by protection; 
• indirectly proportional to income in the country: all else being equal, the lower 
the income is the greater the effort is.  
The welfare effort for each country is the result of its situation in each of these 
immediate determinants. A lower level of effort may, a priori, be due to a low 
incidence or to a high level of income per capita, and not chiefly to any failure to 
protect persons suffering social contingencies.  On the other hand, a relatively high 
welfare effort could be due to low levels of prosperity or to a higher incidence of 
social need.  In other words, identical welfare effort levels may conceal very 
different situations.  
To determine the extent to which these situations are found in the OECD 21 group, 
the determinants of the welfare effort in each country are calculated in relative 
terms1. The reference used in all cases is the value of the determinants calculated 
for the 21 countries considered as a whole.  Deviations in welfare effort can be 
expressed as the sum of the deviations in each of the determinants plus the 
crossed products of those deviations.  In view of the data obtained, some of the 
conclusions drawn at first sight from the analysis of welfare effort need to be 
qualified. 
The general situation reveals a trend towards stability in welfare effort, especially 
from 1990 onwards.  But that trend coincides with an increase in objective 
situations of need over the whole period (incidence).  When the same resources 
must meet an increased volume of social needs the result is a fall in the standard of 
protection, at least in relative terms.  This can be seen in public social spending per 
dependent (Table 3), where the rate of increase slows particularly as from 1990, 
and in the generosity measure (Table 5), where generalised reductions are 
observed from that time onwards.  
According to welfare effort, there is a fall of 36 percentage points in the relative 
position of Ireland in the period 1980-2001.  However, the reasons for this drop do 
                                           
1 The results are shown in tables 3 to 8 in the data annex.  In all these tables GDP and public 
social spending are measured in current PPP units referred to the dollar.  The annex also 
contains tables showing trends in public social spending per dependent (Table 3), the 
percentage represented by the dependent population or incidence (Table 4) and the ratio of 
welfare effort to incidence measure, or generosity measure (Table 5).  
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not lie in a worsening of the attention given to each situation covered by 
protection: indeed, Ireland's position improves substantially in this aspect, climbing 
from 30 points below the average figure in 1980 to three points above it in 2001 
(see Illustration 1).  The absolute and relative reductions in effort levels in Ireland 
are explained by the reduction in the incidence of situations covered by protection 
and the considerable economic growth that the country enjoyed over the period 
considered.  In the Netherlands, however, the situation is very different and the 
results for welfare effort do correspond with the figures for standards of protection.  
Illustration 1. Deviations in effort, standards of protection, incidence and 
income measures for Ireland. 
 
Source: As for tables in annex. 
The second conclusion obtained from the analysis of welfare effort is that 
adjustments were concentrated in the Social-democratic world. Perhaps the most 
striking case is Denmark, which is one of the bastions of social democracy but 
nevertheless has the dubious honour of having the third smallest growth in effort 
(after Ireland and the Netherlands) in any of the countries studied over the 21-year 
period. This conclusion is less clear when the immediate determinants of welfare 
effort are considered.  Over the period as a whole the fall in the relative effort level 
conceals the fact that in Denmark and Norway the standard of protection rises not 
only in absolute terms but also relative to the trend in the group of countries 
analysed as a whole, and in Finland it remains steady.  In the case of Denmark this 
rise is not reflected in welfare effort due to the considerable reduction in relative 
incidence levels for the contingencies of old age and unemployment.  The effect is 
even more striking if the analysis is limited to the 1990s.  This case and that of 
Ireland provide the clearest examples of just how unfortunate appreciations based 
exclusively on welfare effort can be.  
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Illustration 2. Deviations in effort, standards of protection, incidence and 
income measures for the Social-democratic world. 
 
Source: As for tables in annex. 
In southern Europe the situation is similar.  If welfare effort levels alone are 
considered, the conclusion drawn is that the biggest rise in spending in relative 
terms takes place among this group of countries, with rises in every country in the 
group. However, more detailed observation reveals that improvements in adjusted 
standards are actually far more modest, and that the major rise in effort is due 
largely to the increased incidence of the situations covered by protection.  A look at 
events in each country reveals two very different paths: on the one hand there are 
relative improvements in the standard of protection in Portugal and Greece, 
particularly in the former, while on the other hand standard decreases in Spain and 
Italy (following a slight improvement up to 1990 in the latter).  The final result in 
terms of effort is made to look better than it actually is by the trend in incidence 
and per capita income.   
Finally, the conclusion on the convergence of protection systems must also be 
qualified. A comparison between Table 1 and Table 3 in the data annex shows that 
the reduction in coefficients of variation is far greater under welfare effort than 
under the standard of protection measure. Furthermore, illustration 5 shows an 
increase of the dispersion in the indicator of incidence. This means that is the 
quality itself of the welfare effort measure which is worsening. 
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Illustration 3. Deviations in effort, standards of protection, incidence and 
income measures for Denmark 
 
Source: As for tables in annex. 
Illustration 4. Deviations in effort, standards of protection, incidence and 
income measures for Southern Europe 
 
Source: As for tables in annex. 
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Two interconnected conclusions can be drawn from the evidence in this heading: 
one of them positive and the other normative.  Firstly, the performance of welfare 
effort is conditioned by economic and socio-demographic variables that may, and 
indeed do, hinder the full and exact representation of the extent to which reforms 
in social policies have affected the way in which social needs are covered.  
Secondly, bearing in mind this evidence it seems inadvisable to use welfare effort 
when the intention is precisely to measure the consequences of the crisis on the 
level of attention provided in each country through social protection mechanisms. 
Illustration 5. Evolution of coefficients of variation in welfare effort and 
standard of protection. 
 
Source: As for tables in annex. 
4 Alternatives to welfare effort 
One practical way of solving the problems posed by welfare effort is to supplement 
it with other measures that better express changes over time in protection 
systems.  Table 2 shows an exhaustive list of possibilities for constructing measures 
of the various dimensions of social protection systems. 
One idea is to use synthetic standard of protection measures. The standard of 
social protection is intuitively understood to be linked to the speed and 
effectiveness with which protection services deal with the various risk situations 
incurred by the citizens of a country as a result of events that fall under their area 
of authority, and the extent to which they manage to re-establish the quality of life 
that those citizens enjoyed prior to the appearance of the contingencies in question. 
Two of the most widely used standard of protection measures are social spending 
per capita and social spending per dependent (Alsasua et al., 2007 & 2001; Castles, 
2004; Clayton & Pontusson, 1998). Both these measures were used in the previous 
section of this article.  Although they are better suited than welfare effort to 
measuring the degree of protection provided by institutions, they both have serious 
drawbacks. Population numbers are not the most appropriate yardstick for 
measuring the needs covered by protection systems, and nor is the “dependent 
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population”, because it fails to take into account that some of the contingencies 
that protection systems were designed to cover are not directly concerned with 
unemployment or old-aged. Moreover, this measurement wrongly assumes that the 
needs of an old person are the same (or at least that both sets of needs can be met 
with the same volume of resources) as those of an unemployed person.  The 
problems of synthetic standard of protection measures can be said to stem from 
the fact that it is not possible to work with a single, homogenous measurement for 
all the contingencies that social protection institutions were designed to cover.  
A second option that has enjoyed considerable support in the relevant literature is 
to work with replacement rates. These rates measure the extent to which cash 
benefits restore the purchasing power of individuals and households that have 
suffered contingencies such as sickness, unemployment or retirement. Replacement 
rates and other indices based on the same measurements have been used to 
describe the extent of the retrenchment of social policies during the period of crisis, 
to detect the diverse natures of welfare states and to assess the hypothesis of 
convergence of social protection systems (Scruggs, 2006; Allan & Scruggs, 2004; 
Korpi & Palme, 2003; Montanari, 2001; Korpi, 1989). They have been used mainly 
by authors who consider that the volume of resources consumed is merely an 
epiphenomenon of social protection systems, a by-product of their operation that 
does not reflect their essential substance, to wit the extent to which they specify 
and protect the social rights of citizens in a political community and the extent to 
which they free those citizens from their dependence on the labour market and the 
circumstances that prevail in that market (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1989).  
Replacement rates are a highly precise measurement in this context, because they 
report on the extent to which an individual and his/her family can maintain their 
purchasing power when they are unable for any given reason (e.g. sickness, 
unemployment or old age) to obtain the income provided previously by their 
participation in the labour market.  
Table 2. Types of measure for measuring the dimensions of social 
protection systems. 
Dimension\Type of 
measure 
Synthetic measures Specific measures 
Welfare Effort Social spending as a 
percentage of GDP 
X 
Standards of protection Social spending per capita or 
social spending per 
dependent 
Measurements concerned 
with social spending per 
capita 
Simple indices, e.g. spending 
on old age per person aged 
65 or over 
Replacement rates for 
benefits that replace income 
Coverage X Coverage of certain benefits 
(health) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Using replacement rates solves some of the problems of the measures described 
above, but also introduces new ones.  
− The main drawback of replacement rates is probably that they can only be 
applied to benefits that replace income.  A large part of the social protection 
system - including such important areas as disability, housing, social exclusion 
and healthcare - falls outside the resulting description.  In other words, 
comparisons based on replacement rates fail to take part of social spending into 
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account, so the conclusions drawn from them must be considered as partial at 
best.  
− Moreover, the quality of the results of these measures is affected by the 
substitutability of some benefits. The problem of substitutability arises when 
more than one action can be taken to resolve the same type of social need, e.g. 
retirement pensions and other benefits in kind linked to old-age. In the 
presence of substitutability, considering close aggregates of benefits may 
reduce the quality of measurements. For example, Scruggs (2006) finds that 
the replacement rates of standard pensions are higher in the conservative world 
than in the social-democratic world2. This occurs because in the latter much of 
the attention received by the elderly is provided through benefits in kind linked 
to residential care or care in the home.  When total spending on old age is 
considered rather than spending on pensions alone, the volume of resources 
dedicated per elderly person in social-democratic countries exceeds the figure in 
conservative countries3.  
− Finally, the usefulness of replacement rates is limited by the implicit difficulty of 
obtaining data for analysis. The Swedish Institute of Social Research is 
conducting a programme to construct an extensive database containing series 
for the replacement rates of the main financial benefits.  Nevertheless, to date 
this information has not been disclosed to the rest of the Academy (Castles, 
2002: 616; however, see Scruggs: Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset -
http://www.sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/wp.htm-). 
However, there are other possibilities available regarding the construction of 
measures that have not been considered so frequently. For instance, it is possible 
to use simple indexes by working with social expenditure oriented to a specific 
population group or a specific risk. For example, the social expenditure devoted to 
the old age function that a country invests in each person aged 65 or more, can 
also be figured out. This indicator can be improved by relating the result obtained 
to a wage reference, for example, the manual worker’s average wage. When 
calculating the overall spending related to old-age people, this type of measures 
solves the problems provoked by the substitutability of benefits just on a partial 
basis that do affect substitution rates. 
A more definitive solution results from using a synthetic indicator that is not 
affected by the of substitutability problems, and that is able to properly eliminate 
the effects of the socio-demographic factors giving rise to the objective demand of 
benefits in each country and year. 
An indicator of this type could be referred to as synthetic measure for standards of 
protection. To calculate it, it is necessary: 
− To bring together a set of measures that can measure reasonably well the 
objective situations of need that trigger action by social protection systems.  
The relationship between these variables and social spending per capita must be 
checked empirically in the geopolitical framework of reference of the analysis.  
− To quantify the impact of objective needs on aggregate social spending.  
− If these two objectives are met there should be nothing to prevent a spending 
pattern from being established.  Such a pattern indicates the relationship 
                                           
2 In 2002 the average replacement rate in conservative countries (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) was put by this author at 67%, compared to 60% in 
social-democratic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) (Scruggs, 2006: Table 1). 
3 According to our own calculations, average spending per person aged 65 and over in 2002 
was 77% of the average salary of manual workers in conservative countries, and 84% in 
social-democratic countries.  
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between the objective conditions of demand and theoretical social spending.  If 
a country is perfectly adjusted to this spending rule, actual per capita spending 
on its social protection system should be identical to theoretical spending.  If 
actual spending is lower than the figure resulting from the rule, that country can 
be said to have a lower relative propensity to social spending, and if it is higher 
the propensity is also higher.  
This type of measure has been successfully applied in some recent works 
(Olaskoaga, Aláez y Díaz de Basurto; 2008; Alsasua, Bilbao y Olaskoaga, 2007) its 
main advantage being that it offers a different view, and probably a most realistic 
one, of the recent development of the welfare states in the Western world 
(Olaskoaga, 2008). 
Conclusions 
This article contains a brief outline of the pros and cons of welfare effort and other 
measures available for comparing the relative state of development of social 
policies. 
No doubt, the welfare effort has been the one most frequently used in literature, 
but it may be said to have serious drawbacks, the main consequence of which is 
that the image obtained from it does not match reality. For instance, the welfare 
effort overvalues the effect of the social expending cuts in those countries, for 
example Denmark, where the incidence has been reduced in relative terms, or in 
those such as Ireland where the economic growth has been faster. On the other 
hand, the welfare effort overestimates the convergence of the Southern European 
countries towards the expenditure level of their neighbouring northern countries, 
since it disregards the fact that in most of the former, the incidence of the social 
problems shows a higher increase than in other countries.  
Summing up, in the light of the drawbacks relating to the welfare effort measure, 
this article recommends the use of a wider range of measures. The most intelligent 
attitude is not to rule out any alternative, since a diversity of approaches may be 
considered as a virtue in a problem such as this one, where no single optimum 
solution can be seen 
In fact, this article shows that there is room to design measures other than those 
most frequently used in literature. More specifically, one cannot overlook the 
possibility that the use of these measures might give rise to different conclusions 
on the recent development of the welfare state from a political, sociological and 
economic viewpoint. 
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5 Data annex 
Table 3. Standards of protection. Public social spending per dependent *** 
in 1995 dollars. 
Country 1980 1990 2001 1990-2001 1980-2001 
Australia 14,741 18,239 27,354 9,115 12,613 
Canada 18,914 23,289 25,701 2,412 6,787 
USA 18,522 22,456 31,181 8,725 12,659 
Ireland 13,774 17,272 31,331 14,059 17,557 
New Zealand 22,342 22,944 23,544 600 1,202 
UK 14,890 18,849 27,728 8,879 12,839 
Liberal* 17,655 21,595 29,875 8,281 12,221 
Denmark 44,100 45,956 65,608 19,652 21,509 
Finland 27,155 44,833 40,231 -4,602 13,076 
Norway 26,706 37,608 56,464 18,856 29,758 
Sweden 38,281 45,857 48,671 2,814 10,390 
Social-democratic* 35,677 44,121 51,574 7,453 15,897 
Germany 35,980 42,012 42,130 117 6,150 
Austria 30,884 39,936 49,980 10,044 19,096 
Belgium 29,260 37,158 39,986 2,828 10,726 
France 27,118 38,367 43,253 4,887 16,135 
The Netherlands 41,332 42,481 44,878 2,397 3,547 
Conservative* 32,402 40,238 42,873 2,635 10,471 
Spain 11,231 13,590 16,208 2,618 4,977 
Greece 8,694 13,605 15,291 1,686 6,597 
Italy 17,165 21,663 23,886 2,223 6,721 
Portugal 5,337 8,731 14,654 5,923 9,317 
Southern Europe* 13,551 17,283 19,791 2,508 6,239 
Japan 29,038 34,495 36,558 2,063 7,520 
Switzerland 39,292 53,755 70,943 17,189 31,651 
All* 22,393 27,422 33,283 5,861 10,891 
Coefficient of variation ** 44.8 42.3 41.5     
Sources: a) For social spending: OECD, SOCX. 
 b) For population: OECD, Health Data. 
 c) For unemployed population: OECD, LFS. 
* The figures given for each family or regime and for the "All" category indicate the level of 
spending as a whole in the aggregate category in question, measured in US dollars. 
** The coefficient of variation is expressed in percentage terms. 
*** “Dependent population” is understood to mean the population aged 65 and over plus the 
unemployed population. 
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Table 4. Incidence. Unemployed population plus population aged 65 and 
over (as a percentage of the total population) 
Country 1980 1990 2001 1990-2001 1980-2001 
Australia 12.3 14.5 15.9 1.3 3.6 
Canada 13.0 15.4 16.4 1.0 3.4 
USA 14.7 15.3 14.8 -0.6 0.1 
Ireland 13.4 16.3 12.9 -3.4 -0.5 
New Zealand 10.6 14.8 14.5 -0.3 3.9 
UK 17.6 19.2 18.2 -0.9 0.6 
Liberal* 14.9 15.9 15.4 -0.5 0.5 
Denmark 18.0 20.3 17.4 -2.9 -0.6 
Finland 14.4 15.0 19.6 4.6 5.3 
Norway 15.5 19.0 16.9 -2.1 1.3 
Sweden 17.4 18.8 20.2 1.4 2.8 
Social-democratic* 16.6 18.3 18.8 0.5 2.3 
Germany 17.0 17.6 21.4 3.8 4.5 
Austria 16.2 16.6 17.3 0.7 1.1 
Belgium 17.5 18.6 21.1 2.5 3.6 
France 16.7 18.0 20.1 2.1 3.4 
The Netherlands 13.8 16.3 15.0 -1.3 1.2 
Conservative* 16.6 17.6 20.2 2.5 3.6 
Spain 15.3 20.1 21.5 1.5 6.2 
Greece 14.1 16.8 21.1 4.2 6.9 
Italy 15.9 19.5 21.9 2.4 6.1 
Portugal 14.9 15.9 18.5 2.6 3.6 
Southern Europe* 15.4 19.1 21.4 2.3 6.0 
Japan 10.1 13.1 20.6 7.5 10.6 
Switzerland 14.4 15.3 17.5 2.2 3.1 
All* 15.5 17.0 17.7 0.7 2.2 
Coefficient of variation ** 14.5 11.7 14.4 - - 
Sources: a) For population: OECD, Health Data. 
 b) For unemployed population: OECD, LFS. 
** The coefficient of variation is expressed in percentage terms. 
*** “Dependent population” is understood to mean the population aged 65 and over plus the 
unemployed population. 
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Table 5. Generosity***. 
Country 1980 1990 2001 1990-2001 1980-2001 
Australia 92.7 98.6 114.0 15.4 21.3 
Canada 109.8 120.5 108.8 -11.7 -1.0 
USA 90.6 87.7 99.9 12.2 9.3 
Ireland 126.4 114.5 107.0 -7.5 -19.4 
New Zealand 162.0 149.8 128.8 -21.0 -33.2 
UK 101.7 102.5 119.1 16.6 17.5 
Liberal* 94.0 92.7 102.6 9.9 8.6 
Denmark 161.5 144.4 168.3 23.9 6.8 
Finland 129.2 164.8 126.2 -38.5 -2.9 
Norway 115.2 130.2 141.6 11.4 26.3 
Sweden 165.2 164.1 147.3 -16.7 -17.9 
Social-democratic* 150.7 152.9 144.8 -8.1 -5.9 
Germany 135.5 129.5 128.0 -1.6 -7.6 
Austria 138.9 145.3 148.2 2.9 9.4 
Belgium 137.3 144.9 129.1 -15.8 -8.3 
France 129.5 151.5 145.6 -5.9 16.1 
The Netherlands 195.0 169.7 144.9 -24.8 -50.1 
Conservative* 138.5 142.4 135.6 -6.7 -2.8 
Spain 103.8 97.4 89.9 -7.5 -13.8 
Greece 82.7 127.3 115.4 -11.8 32.8 
Italy 117.6 119.3 112.5 -6.8 -5.1 
Portugal 72.8 87.7 114.3 26.6 41.4 
Southern Europe* 110.4 113.6 106.3 -7.3 -4.1 
Japan 101.0 85.2 81.8 -3.3 -19.2 
Switzerland 99.7 117.0 151.3 34.3 51.6 
All* 111.8 106.8 104.5 -2.2 -7.3 
Coefficient of variation ** 24.5 20.6 17.1 - - 
Sources: a) For social spending: OECD, SOCX. 
 b) For population: OECD, Health Data. 
 c) For unemployed population: OECD, LFS. 
*The figures given for each family or regime and for the "All" category indicate the level of 
spending as a whole in the aggregate category in question, measured in US dollars as a 
percentage of aggregate GDP in the same accounting unit.  
** The coefficient of variation is expressed in percentage terms. 
*** The generosity measure is the ratio of the standard of protection measure to welfare 
effort, expressed as the percentage of GDP devoted to social spending per percentage point 
of the dependent population.  
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Table 6. Deviations with regard to OECD-21. 1980 
Country 
Deviation in 
effort 
Deviation in 
standard of 
protection 
Deviation in 
incidence 
Deviation in 
income ** 
Australia -0.29 -0.18 -0.16 0.04 
Canada -0.10 0.12 -0.10 -0.10 
USA -0.17 -0.02 0.01 -0.16 
Ireland 0.07 -0.30 -0.08 0.64 
New Zealand 0.08 0.22 -0.27 0.21 
UK 0.13 -0.20 0.21 0.16 
Liberal* -0.12 -0.05 0.02 -0.09 
Denmark 0.83 0.52 0.24 -0.03 
Finland 0.17 0.07 -0.01 0.10 
Norway 0.13 -0.01 0.07 0.06 
Sweden 0.81 0.53 0.20 -0.01 
Social-democratic* 0.57 0.35 0.14 0.02 
Germany 0.44 0.35 0.17 -0.08 
Austria 0.41 0.26 0.11 0.01 
Belgium 0.52 0.22 0.21 0.03 
France 0.33 0.13 0.12 0.04 
The Netherlands 0.69 0.76 -0.05 0.01 
Conservative* 0.43 0.29 0.13 -0.02 
Spain 0.00 -0.37 0.05 0.51 
Greece -0.28 -0.46 -0.05 0.41 
Italy 0.16 -0.02 0.08 0.10 
Portugal -0.32 -0.65 0.03 0.93 
Southern Europe* 0.05 -0.22 0.05 0.29 
Japan -0.36 -0.18 -0.31 0.13 
Switzerland -0.11 0.22 -0.02 -0.25 
Sources: As for Tables 3-5.  
* The figures for each family are not obtained as simple averages for the countries involved 
but rather by re-calculating welfare effort levels and their determinants for each aggregate. 
** The “Deviation in Income” column shows the deviations for the inverse value of income 
per capita. Positive figures in this column indicate under-average per capita income levels. 
*** By contrast with Tables 3–5, here GDP and public social spending are measured in 
current PPP units referring to the dollar. 
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Table 7. Deviations with regard to OECD-21. 1990 
Country 
Deviation in 
effort 
Deviation in 
standard of 
protection 
Deviation in 
incidence 
Deviation in 
income ** 
Australia -0.18 -0.20 -0.12 0.16 
Canada 0.08 0.13 -0.05 0.01 
USA -0.22 -0.03 -0.06 -0.15 
Ireland 0.08 -0.28 0.00 0.49 
New Zealand 0.27 0.02 -0.10 0.38 
UK 0.13 -0.17 0.17 0.17 
Liberal* -0.15 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 
Denmark 0.70 0.29 0.24 0.05 
Finland 0.43 0.45 -0.08 0.07 
Norway 0.43 0.14 0.16 0.08 
Sweden 0.78 0.50 0.15 0.03 
Social-democratic* 0.62 0.37 0.12 0.05 
Germany 0.32 0.29 0.08 -0.06 
Austria 0.39 0.33 0.02 0.03 
Belgium 0.56 0.27 0.14 0.08 
France 0.54 0.31 0.08 0.09 
The Netherlands 0.60 0.48 0.00 0.08 
Conservative* 0.44 0.32 0.07 0.02 
Spain 0.13 -0.38 0.23 0.48 
Greece 0.21 -0.31 0.01 0.74 
Italy 0.35 0.01 0.20 0.11 
Portugal -0.20 -0.54 -0.03 0.78 
Southern Europe* 0.24 -0.19 0.17 0.30 
Japan -0.35 -0.21 -0.19 0.01 
Switzerland 0.04 0.36 -0.06 -0.19 
Sources & notes: as for table 6.  
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Table 8. Deviations with regard to OECD 21. 2001 
Country 
Deviation in 
effort 
Deviation in 
standard of 
protection 
Deviation in 
incidence 
Deviation in 
income ** 
Australia -0.07 0.01 -0.13 0.06 
Canada -0.08 0.04 -0.10 -0.02 
USA -0.24 0.13 -0.18 -0.17 
Ireland -0.29 0.03 -0.29 -0.03 
New Zealand -0.04 -0.12 -0.21 0.37 
UK 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.07 
Liberal* -0.17 0.10 -0.15 -0.12 
Denmark 0.51 0.59 -0.04 -0.01 
Finland 0.28 0.07 0.08 0.10 
Norway 0.24 0.67 -0.07 -0.21 
Sweden 0.54 0.28 0.12 0.08 
Social-democratic* 0.41 0.36 0.04 0.00 
Germany 0.42 0.05 0.18 0.14 
Austria 0.34 0.36 -0.03 0.02 
Belgium 0.41 0.13 0.17 0.07 
France 0.47 0.25 0.08 0.09 
The Netherlands 0.12 0.34 -0.17 0.01 
Conservative* 0.40 0.15 0.10 0.10 
Spain 0.01 -0.38 0.20 0.36 
Greece 0.26 -0.37 0.16 0.70 
Italy 0.26 -0.08 0.20 0.14 
Portugal 0.09 -0.34 0.02 0.62 
Southern Europe* 0.17 -0.23 0.18 0.28 
Japan -0.13 -0.30 0.14 0.09 
Switzerland 0.37 0.44 -0.04 -0.02 
Sources & notes: As for table 6.  
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